N-player quantum games in an EPR setting

# N-player quantum games in an EPR setting

James M. Chappell, Azhar Iqbal and Derek Abbott School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University of Adelaide 5005, Australia
July 12, 2019
###### Abstract

The -player quantum game is analyzed in the context of an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiment. In this setting, a player’s strategies are not unitary transformations as in alternate quantum game-theoretic frameworks, but a classical choice between two directions along which spin or polarization measurements are made. The players’ strategies thus remain identical to their strategies in the mixed-strategy version of the classical game. In the EPR setting the quantum game reduces itself to the corresponding classical game when the shared quantum state reaches zero entanglement. We find the relations for the probability distribution for -qubit GHZ and W-type states, subject to general measurement directions, from which the expressions for the mixed Nash equilibrium and the payoffs are determined. Players’ payoffs are then defined with linear functions so that common two-player games can be easily extended to the -player case and permit analytic expressions for the Nash equilibrium. As a specific example, we solve the Prisoners’ Dilemma game for general . We find a new property for the game that for an even number of players the payoffs at the Nash equilibrium are equal, whereas for an odd number of players the cooperating players receive higher payoffs.

## I Introduction

The field of game theory deals with situations involving strategic interdependence between a set of rational participants. The study of classical game theory began around 1944 (vonNeumanMorgenstern, ; Binmore, ; Rasmusen, ), and was extended to the quantum regime, in 1999, by Meyer (MeyerDavid, ) and Eisert et al (Eisert1999, ) and has since been developed by many others Blaquiere (); Wiesner (); Mermin (); Peres (); Mermin1 (); Vaidman (); BenjaminHayden (); EnkPike2002 (); Johnson (); MarinattoWeber (); IqbalToor1 (); DuLi (); Du (); Piotrowski (); IqbalToor3 (); FlitneyAbbott1 (); IqbalToor2 (); Piotrowski1 (); Shimamura1 (); FlitneyAbbott2 (); YongJianHan2002 (); IqbalWeigert (); Mendes (); CheonTsutsui (); IqbalEpr:2005 (); Ozdemir2004 (); CheonAIP (); Shimamura (); IchikawaTsutsui (); OzdemirShimamura (); FlitneyGreentree (); IqbalCheon (); Ichikawa (); Ramzan (); FlitneyHollenberg2006 (); Aharon (); Bleiler (); ahmed2008three (); Qiang (); NFJP2010 (); IqbalAbbott (); CIL (); IqbalCheonAbbott (); ChappellB (); Chappell3Player (); FlitneyAbbottRoyal (); NawazToor (); GuoZhang (); iqbal2009quantum (). Initially, studies in the arena of quantum games focused on two-player, two-strategy non-cooperative games but has now been extended to multi-player games by various authors (Popescu1995, ; BenjaminHayden, ; iqbalCheonConf, ; Broom_Cannings_Vickers_1997, ; QingChen2004, ; DuLi, ; du2002Multi, ; Mermin1, ; Flitney2009, ; Boyer2004quant, ). Quantum games have been reported in which players share Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states and W states (YongJianHan2002, ; Peres, ; Chappell3Player, ), with analysis showing the benefits of players forming coalitions (IqbalToor3, ; FlitneyGreentree, ) and also the effects of noise (FlitneyAbbott2, ; Ramzan, ). Such games can be used to describe multipartite situations, such as in the analysis of secure quantum communication (NielsenChuang:2002, ).

The usual approach to implementing quantum games involves players sharing a multi-qubit quantum state with each player having access to an allocated qubit upon which they perform local unitary transformations; then a supervisor submits each qubit to measurement in order to determine the outcome of the game. An alternative approach in constructing quantum games uses an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type setting (IqbalWeigert, ; IqbalEpr:2005, ; IqbalCheon, ; EPR, ; Bohm, ; Bell, ; Bell1, ; Bell2, ; Aspect, ; ClauserShimony, ; Cereceda, ; IqbalCheonAbbott, ), based on a framework developed by Mermin Mermin () in 1990. In this approach, quantum games are described within an EPR apparatus, with the players’ strategies now being the classical choice between two possible measurement directions implemented when measuring their qubit. This thus becomes equivalent to the standard arrangement for playing a classical mixed-strategy game, in that in each run a player has a choice between two pure strategies. Thus, as the players’ strategy sets remain classical, the EPR type setting avoids a well known criticism (EnkPike2002, ) of conventional quantum games, stemming from the fact that typically, in quantum game frameworks, players are given access to extended strategy sets consisting of local unitary transformations that can be interpreted as fundamentally changing the underlying classical game, and thus not being an authentic extension of it.

Recently CIL (); ChappellB (); Chappell3Player () the formalism of Clifford’s geometric algebra (GA) (Hestenes111, ; GA, ; Doran2003, ; Venzo2007, ; Dorst:2002, ) has been applied in the analysis of quantum games. These works demonstrate that the formalism of GA facilitates analysis and improves the geometric visualization of the game. Multipartite quantum games are usually found significantly harder to analyze, as we are required to define an payoff matrix and calculate measurement outcomes over -qubit states. In this regard, GA is identified as the most suitable formalism in order to allow ease of analysis. This becomes particularly convincing in the case where , where matrix methods become unworkable. As we will later show, an algebraic approach such as GA is both elegant and tractable as .

Using an EPR type setting we firstly determine the probability distribution of measurement outcomes, giving the player payoffs, and then determine constraints that ensure a faithful embedding of the mixed-strategy version of the original classical game within the corresponding quantum game. We then apply our results to an player prisoner dilemma (PD) game.

## Ii EPR setting for playing multi-player quantum games

The EPR setting (IqbalWeigert, ; IqbalCheon, ; IqbalCheonAbbott, ) for a multi-player quantum game assumes that players are spatially-separated participants of a non-cooperative game, who are located at the arms of an EPR system (Peres, ), as shown in Fig. 1. In one run of the experiment, each player chooses one out of two possible measurement directions. These two directions in space, along which spin or polarization measurements can be made, are the players’ strategies. As shown in Fig. 1, we represent the players’ two measurement directions as , with a measurement returning or .

Over a large number of runs consisting of a sequence of -particle quantum systems emitted from a source, upon which measurements are performed on each qubit, subject to the players choices of measurement direction, a record is maintained of the experimental outcomes from which players’ payoffs can be determined. These payoffs depend on the -tuples of the various players’ strategic choices made over a large number of runs and on the dichotomic outcomes (measuring spin-up or spin-down) from the measurements performed along those directions.

### ii.1 Clifford’s geometric algebra (GA)

Typically in a quantum game analysis the tensor product formalism along with Pauli matrices are employed, however matrices become cumbersome for higher dimensional spaces, and so GA is seen as an essential substitute in this case, where the tensor product is replaced with the geometric product and the Pauli matrices are replaced with algebraic elements. The use of GA has also previously been developed in the context of quantum information processing (GA4, ).

To setup the required algebraic framework, we firstly denote as a basis for . Following ChappellB (); Chappell3Player (), we can then form the bivectors , which are non-commuting for , with but if we have . We also have the trivector

 ι=e1e2e3, (1)

finding and furthermore, that commutes with each vector , thus acting in a similar fashion to the unit imaginary . We have and so for cyclic . We can therefore summarize the algebra of the basis elements by the relation

 eiej=δij+ιϵijkek, (2)

which is isomorphic to the algebra of the Pauli matrices (Doran2003, ), but now defined as part of .

In order to express quantum states in GA we use the one-to-one mapping (Doran2003, ; Dorst:2002, ) defined as follows

 |ψ⟩=α|0⟩+β|1⟩=[a0+ia3−a2+ia1]↔ψ=a0+a1ιe1+a2ιe2+a3ιe3, (3)

where are real scalars and .

### ii.2 Symmetrical N qubit states

For -player quantum games an entangled state of qubits is prepared, which for fair games should be symmetric with regard to the interchange of the players, and it is assumed that all information about the state once prepared is known by the players. Two types of entangled starting states can readily be identified which are symmetrical with respect to the players. The GHZ-type state

 |GHZ⟩N=cosγ2|00…0⟩+sinγ2|11…1⟩, (4)

where we include an entanglement angle and the -type state

 |W⟩N=1√N(|1000…00⟩+|0100…00⟩+|0010…00⟩+⋯+|0000…01⟩). (5)

To represent these in geometric algebra, we start with the mapping for a single qubit from Eq. (3), finding

 |0⟩⟷1,|1⟩⟷−ιe2, (6)

so that for the GHZ-type state in GA we have

 ψGHZN=cosγ2+(−)Nsinγ2ιe12ιe22…ιeN2, (7)

where the superscript on each bivector indicates which particle space it refers to. Also for the W-type state we have in GA

 ψWN=−1√N(ιe12+ιe22+⋯+ιeN2). (8)

### ii.3 Unitary operations and observables in GA

General unitary operations on a single qubit in GA can be represented as

 R(θ1,θ2,θ3)=e−θ3ιe3/2e−θ1ιe2/2e−θ2ιe3/2, (9)

which is the Euler angle form of a rotation that can completely explore the space of a single qubit, and is equivalent to a general local unitary transformation. We define for a general unitary transformation acting locally on each qubit , which the supervisor applies to the individual qubits that gives the starting state

 (U1⊗U2⊗⋯⊗UN)|ψ⟩, (10)

upon which the players now decide upon their measurement directions.

The overlap probability between two states and , in the -particle case (Doran2003, ), is

 P(ψ,ϕ)=2N−2⟨ψEψ†ϕEϕ†⟩0−2N−2⟨ψJψ†ϕJϕ†⟩0, (11)

where the angle bracket indicates that we retain only the scalar part of the product, and where

 E = N∏b=212(1−ιe13ιeb3)=12N−1⎛⎜ ⎜⎝1+⌊N2⌋∑r=1(−)rCN2r(ιei3)⎞⎟ ⎟⎠,

where returns the nearest integer less than or equal to a given number , and where we define to represent all possible combinations of items taken at a time, acting on the object inside the bracket. For example . The number of terms produced being given by the standard combinatorial formula .

We also have

 J=Eιe13=12N−1⌊N+12⌋∑r=1(−)r+1CN2r−1(ιei3), (13)

where for simplicity, we initially assume that is odd, which simplifies our derivation, and our results can easily be generalized later for all .

The supervisor now submits each qubit for measurement, through Stern-Gerlach type detectors, with each detector being set at one of the two angles chosen by each player. As mentioned, each player’s choice, is a classical choice between two possible measurement directions, and hence each player’s strategy set remains the same as in the classical game, with the quantum outcomes arising solely from the shared quantum state.

In order to calculate the measurement outcomes, we define a separable state , to represent the players directions of measurement, where is a rotor defined in Eq. (9), with probabilistic outcomes calculated according to Eq. (11). The use of Eq. (11) gives the projection of the state onto , and thus returns identical quantum mechanical probabilities conventionally calculated using the projection postulate of quantum mechanics. The set of and outcomes obtained from the measurement of each of the qubits gives a reward to each player according to a payoff matrix . The expected payoff for each player then calculated from

 Πp=1∑i1,…,iN=0Gpi1…iNPi1…iN=f(Pi1…iN), (14)

where is the probability of recording the state upon measurement, where , and is the payoff for this measured state. For large it is preferable to calculate the payoff as some function of the measured states, to avoid the need for large payoff matrices, as developed in Section E.2.

### ii.4 GHZ-type state

Firstly, we calculate the probability distribution of measurement outcomes from Eq. (11), from which we then calculate player payoffs from Eq. (14). For the GHZ-type state we have the first observable given by Eq. (II.3) producing

 ψEψ† = = 12N−1⎛⎜ ⎜⎝1+⌊N2⌋∑r=1(−)rCN2r(Vi3)⎞⎟ ⎟⎠,

where we define , and

 ψJψ†=12N−1cosγ⌊N+12⌋∑r=1(−)r+1CN2r−1(Vi3)−sinγ(⌊N/2⌋∑r=0(−)r+N−12CN2r(Vi2Vj2)Vk1…VN1). (16)

For the measurement settings with a separable wave function , we deduce the observables by setting in Eq. (II.4) and Eq. (16) to be

 ϕJϕ† = 12N−1⌊N+12⌋∑r=1(−)r+1CN2r−1(Mi3) (17) ϕEϕ† = 12N−1⎛⎜ ⎜⎝1+⌊N2⌋∑r=1(−)rCN2r(Mi3)⎞⎟ ⎟⎠,

where . For that allows a rotation of the detectors by an angle , we find

 ϕJϕ† = 12N−1⌊N+12⌋∑r=1(−)r+1CN2r−1(ιei3eικei2) (18) ϕEϕ† = 12N−1⎛⎜ ⎜⎝1+⌊N2⌋∑r=1(−)rCN2r(ιei3eικei2)⎞⎟ ⎟⎠.

It should be noted in Eq. (18) that we have defined the measurement angles with a simplified rotor, , and we assume no loss of generality, which is in accordance with the known result (Peres, ) that Bell’s inequalities can still be maximally violated when the allowed directions of measurement are located in a single plane, as opposed to being defined in three dimensions.

So, referring to Eq. (11), we find, through combining Eq. (II.4) and Eq. (18)

 2N−2⟨ψEψ†ϕEϕ†⟩0 = 12N⟨(1+⌊N2⌋∑r=1(−)rCN2r(Vi3))(1+⌊N2⌋∑r=1(−)rCN2r(ιei3eικei2))⟩0 = 12N⎛⎜ ⎜⎝1+⌊N2⌋∑r=1CN2r(Ki)⎞⎟ ⎟⎠,

where , using the standard results listed in Appendix A. The cross terms in the expansion of the brackets in Eq. (II.4), do not contribute because we only retain the scalar components in this expression. We also have for the second part of Eq. (11), through combining Eq. (16) and Eq. (18)

 −2N−2⟨ψJψ†ϕJϕ†⟩0=12N(cosγ⌊N+12⌋∑r=1CN2r−1(Ki)+sinγΩ), (20)

where we define

 Ω = ⌊N/2⌋∑r=0(−)rCN2r(Xi2Xj2)Xk1…XN1 (21) Xi1 = Vi1ιei3eικei2=(−sinκ(cosα1cosα2cosα3−sinα2sinα3)+sinα1cosα2cosκ)i Xi2 = Vi2ιei3eικei2=(sinκ(cosα2sinα3+sinα2cosα3cosα1)−sinα1sinα2cosκ)i,

also referring to Appendix A.

#### ii.4.1 Probability amplitudes for N qubit state, general measurement directions

So combining our last two results from Eq. (II.4) and Eq. (20) using Eq. (11), we find the probability to find any outcome after measurement, which can be shown to be valid for all not just odd as initially assumed, is

 Pk1…kN=12N(1+⌊N2⌋∑r=1CN2r(ϵiKi)+cosγ⌊N+12⌋∑r=1CN2r−1(ϵiKi)+ϵ1…NΩsinγ), (22)

where we have included , to select the probability to measure spin-up or spin-down on a given qubit.

If we take , describing the classical limit, we have from Eq. (22)

 Pk1…kN = 12N⎛⎝1+⌊N/2⌋∑r=1CN2r(ϵiKi)+⌊(N+1)/2⌋∑r=1CN2r−1(ϵiKi)⎞⎠ = 12N(1+N∑r=1CNr(ϵiKi)) = 12N(1+ϵ1K1)(1+ϵ2K2)…(1+ϵNKN),

which shows that for zero entanglement we can form a product state as expected. Alternatively with general entanglement, but only for operations on the first two qubits, we have

 Pkikj=18(1+ϵkcosγ)(1+N∑r=2CNr(ϵi))(1+ϵikKi)(1+ϵjkKj), (24)

which shows that for the GHZ-type entanglement that each pair of qubits is mutually un-entangled, a well-known result for GHZ-type states.

#### ii.4.2 Player payoffs

In general, to represent the permutation of signs introduced by the measurement operator we can define for the first player, say Alice,

 ai1…iN=12N1∑j1…jN=0ϵi1…iNG1j1…jN, (25)

so for example, , and we adopt the notation etc., i.e. we write with a 1 in the th position as .

Using the payoff function we find for Alice

 ΠA(κij)=a0…0+⌊N/2⌋∑r=1CN2r(aiKi)+cosγ⌊(N+1)/2⌋∑r=1CN2r−1(aiKi)+ak1…kNΩsinγ (26)

and similarly for the second player, say Bob, where we would use Bob’s payoff matrix in place of Alice’s.

#### ii.4.3 Mixed-strategy payoff relations

For a mixed strategy game, players choose their first measurement direction with probabilities , where and hence choose the direction with probabilities , respectively. Then Alice’s payoff is now given as

 ΠA(x1,x2,…,xN) = x1…xN1∑i,j,k=0Pi1…iN(κ11,κ21,…,κ31)Gi1…iN + ⋯+x1(1−x2)…xN1∑i,j,k=0Pi1…iN(κ11,κ22,…,κ31)Gi1…iN + ⋯+(1−x1)(1−x2)x3…xN1∑i,j,k=0Pi1…iN(κ12,κ22,κ31,…,κN1)Gi1…iN + ⋯+(1−x1)(1−x2)(1−x3)…(1−xN)1∑i,j,k=0Pi1…iN(κ12,κ22,κ32,…,κN2)Gi1…iN.

### ii.5 Embedding the classical game

If we consider a strategy -tuple for example, at zero entanglement, then the payoff for Alice is obtained from Eq. (LABEL:eq:AlicePayoffFourCoin) to be

 ΠA(x1,…,xN) = 12N[G000…0(1+K12)(1+K21)(1+K32)…(1+KN2) (31) +G100…0(1−K12)(1+K21)(1+K32)…(1+KN2) +G010…0(1+K12)(1−K21)(1+K32)…(1+KN2) +G110…0(1−K12)(1−K21)(1+K32)…(1+KN2) +⋯+G111…1(1−K12)(1−K21)(1−K32)…(1−KN2)].

Hence, in order to achieve the classical payoff of , we can see that we require , and .

This shows that we can select any required classical payoff by the appropriate selection of . We therefore have the conditions for obtaining the classical mixed-strategy payoff relations as

 Kij=cosαi1cosκij+sinαi1cosαi3sinκij=±1. (32)

We find two classes of solution: If , then for the equations satisfying we have for Alice in the first equation , or , and for the equations satisfying we have or , which can be combined to give either , and or , and . For the second class with we have the solution and for we have .

So in summary, for both cases we can deduce that the two measurement directions are out of phase with each other, and for the first case () we can freely vary and , and for the second case (), we can freely vary and to change the initial quantum quantum state without affecting the game Nash equilibrium (NE) or payoffs (Rasmusen, ; Binmore, ). These results can be shown to imply in both cases that .

The associated payoff for Alice therefore becomes

 ΠA(x1,x2,…xN) = +⌊N/2⌋∑r=1CN2r[a1i(1−2x1)(1−2xi)+a0ij(1−2xi)(1−2xj)].

For example, for three players this will reduce to

 ΠA(x1,x2,x3) = a000+a011(1−2x2)(1−2x3)+a110(1−2x1)((1−2x2)+(1−2x3)) − cosγ(a111(1−2x1)(1−2x2)(1−2x3)+a100(1−2x1)+a001(2−2x2−2x3)),

in agreement with previous results for three-player games (Chappell3Player, ). Now, we can write the equations governing the NE for the first player as

 ΠA(xi∗,x2∗,…xN∗)−ΠA(xi,x2∗,…,xN∗) = (x1∗−x1)⎛⎝−⌊N/2⌋∑r=1CN2r(a1iI1(1−2xi∗))+cosγ⌊(N+1)/2⌋∑r=1CN2r−1(ai0I1(1−2xi∗))⎞⎠≥0.

We are using as a placeholder, which has a value one, but ensures that the correct number of terms are formed from . For example, for three players we find the NE governed by

 ΠA(x1∗,x2∗,x3∗)−ΠA(x1,x2∗,x3∗) = (x1∗−x1)[a110(2x2∗−1)+a101(2x3∗−1)+cosγ{a100+a111(2x2∗−1)(2x3∗−1)}]≥0,

in agreement with previous results (Chappell3Player, ).

#### ii.5.1 Symmetric game

For a symmetric game we have , and , and similarly for other symmetries, and using these conditions for a symmetric game, we can find the NE for other players, such as Bob, from the constraint

 ΠA(xi∗,x2∗,…xN∗)−ΠA(xi∗,x2,…,xN∗) = (x2∗−x2)⎛⎝−⌊N/2⌋∑r=1CN2r(a1iI2(1−2xi∗))+cosγ⌊(N+1)/2⌋∑r=1CN2r−1(ai0I2(1−2xi∗))⎞⎠≥0.

We can see that the new quantum behavior is governed solely by the payoff matrix and by the entanglement angle , and not by other properties of the quantum state.

#### ii.5.2 Linear payoff relations

We can see that as , that we need to define an infinite number of components of the payoff matrix as shown by Eq. (25). Hence in order to proceed to solve specific games for large , we need to write the payoff matrix as some functional form of the measurement outcomes, as shown in Eq. (14). The simplest approach is to define linear functions over the set of player choices, as developed in FlitneyHollenberg2006 (), defining the following general payoff function

 $0 = an+b,$1=cn+d, (37)

where is the payoff for players which choose their first measurement direction and is the payoff for the players which choose their second measurement direction, and where is the number of players choosing their first direction and .

This approach enables us to simply define various common games. For example the prisoner dilemma (PD), which has the essential feature that a defecting player achieves a higher payoff, is represented if we have , and . These conditions ensure that if a cooperating player decides to defect, then his payoff rises as determined by Eq. (37). For example for we have defined an player PD, and for we find

 GAij=[3051], (38)

which gives us the typical payoff matrix for two-player PD game. In the EPR setting for the quantum game, a cooperating player is defined as the player who chooses their first measurement direction and a defecting player as one who chooses their second measurement direction.

For the Chicken game (also called the hawk-dove game) Rasmusen (), which involves the situation where the player that does not yield to the other is rewarded, but if neither player yields then they are both severely penalized, in this case we require , and and for the minority game, an implementation would be , and which rewards a minority choice and punishes a majority one. Hence we are led to define

 p1=d−(a+b), p2=c−a, (39)

as two key determinants of quantum games, and we will find that the NE is indeed a function of and alone, see Eq. (42). With this definition the PD game is selected if and and the minority game with and for example.

It should be noted that while the definition in Eq. (37) can generally define an infinite set of PD games through simply putting conditions on and , it is still only a subset of the space of all possible PD games defined over payoff matrices.

Using the linear functions defined in Eq. (37) we find

 a0…0 = 14(N(c+a)−p2+2(b+d)) (40) a10…0 = −14((N−1)(c−a)+2(d−(a+b)))=−14((N−1)p2+2p1) a110…0 = −c−a4=−p24 a1110…0,a11110…0… = 0

and

 a010…0 = c+a4 (41) a011…0,a0111…0,… = 0.

If required, Eq. (37) can be extended with quadratic terms in to allow a greater variety of PD games to be defined, and we find that if this is done that one extra term is added to the series in Eq. (40) and Eq. (41).

#### ii.5.3 NE and payoff for linear payoff relations

We can see that the series in Eq. (40) and Eq. (41) terminates, which thus allows us to simplify the NE conditions, for the first player to

 (x1∗−x1)(p2N∑i=2(1−2xi∗)−cosγ((N−1)p2+2p1))≥0 (42)

and similarly for the other players, which thus determines the available NE for all games, defined as linear functions, in terms of the two parameters and .

The payoff can then also be simplified for the first player to

 ΠA = 14(2(b+d)−p2+(c+a)(N−cosγN∑i=2(1−2xi)) + (1−2x1)(cosγ((N−1)p2+2p1)−p2N∑i=2(1−2xi))).

For the minority game defined previously, we find , which gives an interesting result for this game that both the NE and the payoff are unaffected by the entanglement of the state.

#### ii.5.4 Prisoner dilemma (PD)

For the PD, having and , and we find from the equation for Nash equilibrium in Eq. (42) that in order to produce the classical outcome we require which thus requires and hence the phase transitions, in terms of , are given by

 N−1−2nN−1+δ

where , and with the PD , and hence the above inequality will hold for . So in summary, at the classical limit we have all players defecting, and then we have the transition to the non-classical region at and we then have equally spaced transitions as entanglement increases down to maximum entanglement where we have the number of players cooperating . That is, we always have the same number of transitions for a given number of players, but they concertina closer together as the first transition , moves towards zero, through changing the game parameters, and .

The maximum payoff, close to maximum entanglement, can be found from Eq. (II.5.3) as

 ΠcA = 14(2(b+d)+(c+a)N+(c−a)N∈Odd) (45) ΠdA = 14(2(b+d)+(c+a)N−(c−a)N∈Odd),

where the final term only occurs for odd . So for even the payoffs are equal, but for odd , the cooperating player receives a higher or equal payoff to the defecting player. The payoff rises linearly with , whereas without entanglement, we have the payoff fixed at units from Eq. (37).

#### ii.5.5 The conventional prisoner dilemma (PD) game for all N

For the special case with the PD settings shown in Eq. (38), which gives the conventional PD game for two players, we find from Eq. (39), and , and so we can then simplify the general NE conditions in Eq. (42), for the first player to

 (x1∗−x1)(N∑i=2(1−2xi∗)−(N+1)cosγ)≥0 (46)

and similarly for the other players. The left and right edges of each NE zone, shown in Fig. 2, can now be written from Eq. (44) as

 N−1−2nN+1

In each zone we find the payoff for cooperation and defection, from Eq. (II.5.3), now given by

 Πc = 12(4N−2−n−(4+4N−7n)cosγ) (48) Πd = 12(3N−2+n+(4−3N+7n)cosγ),

which defines the payoff diagram for an player PD, and which produces the classical PD at at zero entanglement.

At each left hand boundary, for the defecting player, we have from Eq. (47), or . Substituting this into the defecting player payoff in Eq. (48), we find

 Πd=−3+74(N+1)(